The special courts handling cases under the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (NDPS Act), frequently address applications for bail, especially concerning quantities of contraband that fall outside the severe strictures of commercial quantity. A recent case, Criminal Bail Application No. 993 of 2024, decided by the Special Court for NDPS Act, 1985, at Gr. Bombay, provides a clear illustration of the judicial approach to bail when the recovered substance is of an “intermediate quantity.” This particular bail application, filed under Section 439 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, sought the release of the applicant/accused, Mohmmad Naved Javed Khan, who was implicated in C.R. No. 359/2024 registered at Dharavi police station, Mumbai, for offences punishable under Section 8(c) read with Section 21(b) of the NDPS Act.
The facts of the case, as presented in the bail application, revolved around the alleged recovery of 31 grams of Mephedrone (MD) from the applicant on April 9, 2024. The core of the argument presented by the learned Advocate for the applicant was that this quantity—31 grams of Mephedrone—constitutes an “intermediate quantity” under the NDPS Act. This is a crucial distinction, as the application of “intermediate quantity” means that the severe limitations imposed by Section 37 of the NDPS Act, which places a heavy burden on the accused to prove their innocence for commercial quantity offenses, are not automatically attracted. The learned Advocate further highlighted that this was the applicant’s first bail application, that he was a permanent resident of Mumbai, had no criminal antecedents, and was prepared to comply with any conditions the court might impose.
The prosecution, represented by the learned APP, opposed the bail application, arguing that the alleged offence was of a serious nature and that the applicant was possessing the Mephedrone for the purpose of sale. The prosecution expressed concern that the applicant might continue to commit similar offences if released on bail, and noted that the investigation was not yet complete. However, the Special Court proceeded to meticulously examine the material on record and the arguments presented. The court acknowledged that the offence, under Section 8(c) read with Section 21(b) of the NDPS Act, carries a punishment that may extend up to 10 years and a fine of up to Rupees One Lakh. Significantly, the court reiterated the finding that the quantity of contraband—31 grams of Mephedrone—was indeed a non-commercial, intermediate quantity, thereby confirming that the stringent rigors of Section 37 of the NDPS Act were not applicable to the case.
In its deliberation, the Special Court observed that the applicant had been in custody since April 9, 2024, and based on the material, it appeared that the investigation concerning the applicant was “almost completed,” with “nothing [further] to be recovered from him.” The court emphasized the fundamental principle that “Personal liberty is most precious of all fundamental rights” and that the object of bail is to secure the accused’s attendance at trial, not to be punitive or preventive. Finding no just ground that necessitated the applicant’s continued detention, the court concluded that the presence of the applicant was likely to be secured even if released on bail, and that the interests of the prosecution could be adequately safeguarded by imposing appropriate conditions.
Consequently, the Criminal Bail Application No. 993/2024 was allowed. The applicant, Mohmmad Naved Javed Khan, was granted bail upon executing a personal bond of Rs. 50,000/- with one or more sureties in a like amount. The release was made conditional upon several key stipulations, including co-operation with the Investigating Officer, not tampering with prosecution evidence or influencing witnesses, co-operating in the early disposal of the trial, and refraining from committing any criminal offence while on bail. This judicial decision clearly underscores the distinction between commercial and intermediate quantities under the NDPS Act and affirms the precedence of personal liberty when the rigors of Section 37 are not applicable, provided that the accused’s attendance and the integrity of the trial process can be secured.